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Abstract
We present a probabilistic extension to active path analyses of token causation
(Halpern and Pearl, 2001, forthcoming; Hitchcock, 2001). The extension uses
the generalized notion of intervention presented in (Korb, Hope, Nicholson, and
Axnick, 2004): we allow an intervention to set any probability distribution over
the intervention variables, not just a single value. The resulting account can han-
dle a wide range of examples. We do not claim the account is complete — only
that it fills an obvious gap in previous active-path approaches. It still succumbs
to recent counterexamples by Hiddleston (2005), because it does not explicitly
consider causal processes. We claim three benefits: a detailed comparison of three
active-path approaches, a probabilistic extension for each, and an algorithmic for-
mulation.
Causal models represent type causation, such as the general effect of smok-
ing on lung cancer. Recently, Halpern & Pearl (2001; forthcoming) and Hitch-
cock (2001) have shown how they can also be used to analyze token causation.
The accounts make sense of token cases where things happen “the hard way”,
and naturally handle troublesome cases involving pre-emption and multiple
paths. Hitchcock’s account is more straightforward, but slightly less gen-
eral. Unfortunately, both accounts assume deterministic networks, which is
unnecessary and contrary to the spirit of causal models.
The basic trick for token causation is to make use of a causal model’s
natural type-causation semantics: C is a cause iff there is a context in which a
change in the value of C would make a difference to E. The problem is that in
token causation, we must restrict which contexts we can consider. Whether
a token event c causes e depends importantly upon the actual context in
which c and e occur. The accounts we present, and therefore our probabilistic
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extension, are just attempts to set out these restrictions. On the accounts
presented here, the relevant contexts are those in the redundancy range
for variables not on the active path.
We acknowledge recent counterexamples (Hiddleston, 2005) showing that
redundancy ranges sometimes pick the wrong context. It is likely that a com-
plete account must make reference to causal processes, and we develop one in
a companion piece (Korb et al., 2005). Nevertheless, we offer this account so
that active path approaches may at least contend in the probabilistic domain.
Significantly, we present algorithms for the theory (see Appendix), opening
the way for automatically comparing accounts of causation on large sets of
examples, rather than the usual handful of successes or failures presented in
any one paper.
1 Deterministic causation
We begin with an example from Hitchcock (2001). A boulder falls F towards
a hiker. The hiker sees the boulder in time, and ducks D, therefore surviving,
S. We represent the causal variables as nodes in a graph, and the causal links
as arrows between them. We specify the exact dependencies with a series of
simple structural equations. So:
F S
D
F = 1
D = F
S = ¬F ∨D
In this example, each variable is binary: 0 (false) or 1 (true). The first
equation gives an initial condition: in the actual world, the boulder falls.
The second says that the hiker ducks if the boulder falls. The third says the
hiker survives if he ducks, or if the boulder does not fall. The equations are
asymmetric because ‘=’ stands for “is determined by”, not mere algebraic
equality. The causal model is fully specified by the graph, the equations, and
the possible values for each variable.
The model encompasses all possibilities we are willing to entertain se-
riously, defining the set of acceptable counterfactuals, and providing truth
conditions for evaluating them, as we see below.
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1.1 Simple Token Causation (H1)
In the Boulder example, we might ask whether ducking causes the hiker to
survive. Intuitively, the answer is “yes”: had the hiker not ducked, he would
not have survived. However, a na¨ıve account might allow counterfactuals to
“backtrack”: had the hiker not ducked, the boulder must not have fallen, so
ducking made no difference to survival. David Lewis ruled out backtracking
in his original counterfactual analysis of causation (1973), because it would
create an unholy symmetry between cause and effect.
Almost any non-backtracking account says that ducking saved the hiker.
Causal models are non-backtracking because we represent counterfactuals
by interventions rather than observations. Instead of treating D = 1 as
an observation on the system, we merely replace the equation for D with a
particular value—holding fixed the background variables (F ) at their actual
values— and let the remaining machinery calculate the answer. In this case,
F is unaltered, as is the equation for S. Then, S = 1 when D = 1 and
S = 0 when D = 0, so ducking makes a difference. Therefore, ducking
caused survival.
When we replace an equation like this, we say we have blocked the path
to D, because there is no longer any counterfactual dependence of D on F .
In effect, by replacing D with a particular value (D = 0), we have removed
the arc F −−I D, or at least blocked the influence travelling along it. Such
“arc surgery” gives an intuitive way to entertain counterfactuals about causal
relationships. Given our causal model, the closest possible world where the
hiker did not duck is just the same model with D = F (an arc) replaced by
D = 0 (a fixed value). The rest of the causal structure is left intact.
So far, this method of counterfactual reasoning accords with Lewisian
counterfactual semantics. Next, we might ask whether the boulder’s fall
caused the hiker to survive. Here, intuition says “no”, and indeed there is no
counterfactual dependence. However, in order to handle other counterexam-
ples, Lewis (1973) abandoned simple counterfactual dependence in favor of
chains of dependence. These “Lewis chains” entail that causation is transi-
tive. Therefore, because S depends on D and D depends on F , Lewis would
say that the boulder’s fall caused the hiker to survive.
Causal model counterfactuals have all the advantages of Lewis chains
without entailing transitivity. Let us see how Hitchcock (2001) handles the
case. We define an Active Path Token Cause.
Definition 1 (APTC) C = c was a token cause of E = e iff there was an
active path from C to E (and actually C = c and E = e).
A path is a walk from C to E along the arrows, in the direction of the
arrows. Intuitively, a path is active if it makes a difference. We take the
simple case first.
A path φ is strongly active if C = c makes a difference to E = e when
all other paths between C and E are blocked by setting variables along
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those paths to their actual values. “Making a difference” has the usual
counterfactual meaning: Had C been different, E would have been different,
for at least some c′ 6= c.
In Boulder, neither of the paths from F to S is strongly active. (In fact
they are not active at all.) First, we hold D fixed at its actual value (D = 1),
and note that the direct path F −−I S is inactive: given that the hiker
ducked, the boulder has no effect. Then, we fix all paths except 〈F,D, S〉.
There being no variables to fix along the other path, we fix nothing, and
note that overall, S does not depend on F . We happily conclude that F
did not cause S. “Intuitively, the falling boulder does not save Hiker’s life
because without it, Hiker’s life would not have been endangered in the first
place” (Hitchcock, 2001).
In general, paths can be long chains like C −−I X −−I Y −−I E. We want
to leave exactly one path φ open, such as the path through D, and block all
others.1 A straightforward (if inefficient) way to do this is to fix all ancestors
of E, except those along φ. This is the background for E, which we shall
call β. It is common to use pi for the parents of E, so we use Π for all the
ancestors. Then we define:
Definition 2 (Background β) Given a target variable E, and a path φ
ending with E, the background β is all the ancestors of E except for those in
φ, which we write: β = Π\φ.
Definition 3 (β-actual model) Given causal model M with target vari-
able E, the β-actual model replaces all the equations for β with their actual
values. The replacements are interventions.
Let c and c′ be states of C, with c the actual state. Let e be the actual
state of E. We use the notation IC=c or just Ic to mean that we intervene to
set C = c, replacing the equation for C with the value c. Likewise, Ic′ means
we intervene to set C = c′. (Similarly, in later sections we may write “set c′”
to mean “set C = c′”, using lowercase letters to denote states of the variable
with the same uppercase letter.)
Then we define:
Definition 4 (Strongly active path) A path φ = 〈C, Y1, . . . , Yn, E〉 is strongly
active in causal model M iff Ic makes a difference to E (relative to Ic′) in
the β-actual model.
In Hitchcock’s examples, all paths to E start at C. But in general, there
can also be external causes. The simplest case is C −−I E J−− D. Our
definition rightly requires us to block all other paths to E, including those
originating from other causes.
1For simplicity, assume any descendants of our target variable (E) are unknown. If
they were known, they would inform us about E, obscuring the causal impact of C.
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If we limit active paths to strongly active paths, APTC gives us Hitch-
cock’s simple account of causation. Following Hiddleston (2005), we shall
call this H1.
Unfortunately, this simple account cannot handle symmetric overdetermi-
nation nor late cutting.
1.2 Symmetric Overdetermination (H2)
Symmetric overdetermination happens when there are multiple sufficient
causes. One such case is Matches. Two lit matches (M1 andM2) are dropped
in the forest. Either one would suffice to burn it down. The forest burns down
(FB).
FB
M1 M 2
M1 = 1
M2 = 1
FB = M1 ∨ML2
Did M1 cause the forest to burn down? Given M2, it made no difference,
so a na¨ıve counterfactual account says no. Hitchcock’s simple account also
says no. Using Definition 4, we fix M2 at its actual value, and find that
the forest burns down regardless of how we set M1. The problem being
symmetric, M2 likewise makes no difference. We have a problem.
Lewis set aside these completely symmetric cases claiming he had no clear
intuitions (1973), and it was “spoils to the victor”. Not only does our analysis
differ from his, but we do have clear intuitions. In fact, both matches con-
tributed, even though neither alone was necessary. It is only by chance that
the actual circumstances have masked the probabilistic dependency. The
causal structure shows how to reveal it.
Note that we can let M2 be 0 without affecting the result—the forest still
burns down. A variable often has several values which on their own make
no difference to the result, or to other variables on our chosen path φ (here
〈M1, FB〉). Hitchcock calls this set of values the redundancy range for
φ. Let us set M2 = 0, a value in the redundancy range. We immediately
see the hidden dependency: now M1 makes a difference! The intuition is
that M1 was really contributing to the causal history, but that its effect was
accidentally masked.
Noting that an instantiated model is one with actual values for its vari-
ables, we define:
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Definition 5 (Redundancy range) Given an instantiated causal modelM,
a path φ = 〈C, Y1, . . . , Yn, E〉, and the background β = Π\φ = {B1, . . . , Bm},
then the corresponding vector of values b′ = 〈b1, . . . , bm〉 lies in β’s redun-
dancy range for φ iff Ib′ leaves φ unchanged.
The redundancy range for path φ is the set of all possible ways of fixing
the background variables so that they make no difference to anything in φ.
Note that the actual values of β are also in the redundancy range!
Definition 6 (β-redundant model) Given a causal model M with back-
ground β, a β-redundant model replaces all B ∈ β with values in their redun-
dancy range for instantiated φ. The replacements are interventions.
An active path is a path that becomes strongly active when we set back-
ground variables to values in their redundancy range. Since the redundancy
range includes the actual values, strongly active paths are themselves active.2
Here is Hitchcock’s definition, rewritten in our terms.
Definition 7 (Active path) A path φ = 〈C, Y1, . . . , Yn, E〉 is active in causal
model M iff Ic makes a difference (relative to Ic′) to E in some β-redundant
model.
Using active paths Hitchcock’s definition can now handle cases of sym-
metric overdetermination: both paths in Matches are active (though not
strongly active), so both matches are causes according to Definition 1. Hid-
dleston calls this account H2.
1.3 Late Cutting
Late cutting is a kind of pre-emptive overdetermination. It occurs when one
of the potential causes pre-empts the other, precisely by completing first. A
common example is Bottle:
Suzy and Billy throw rocks at a bottle. Suzy’s rock arrives first, break-
ing the bottle before Billy’s rock, which would also have broken it.
We want to say that Suzy’s throw caused the bottle to break, but that Billy’s
did not. First, note that the obvious model does not work.
BS
BTST
2For this reason we do not follow Hitchcock in calling it “weakly active”.
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ST = 1
BT = 1
BS = ST ∨BT
This is the same model as Disjunctive Matches, so it gives the same answer:
both Billy’s throw and Suzy’s throw are active, so both caused the bottle to
smash. But our intuitions strongly favor Suzy’s throw over Billy’s. Billy’s
throw was pre-empted.
Halpern and Pearl (2001) argue that we have misrepresented the case.
According to them, since Matches is symmetric and Bottle is not, we cannot
represent both with the same model. They argue that a proper model should
structurally show the key asymmetry in the example: Suzy’s throw hitting
prevents Billy’s from hitting. (We argue elsewhere Korb et al. (2005) that
the verdict is unchanged if we attend to processes. Here we strive merely
to give a probabilistic extension of active path accounts, so we keep to their
formulation.)
Halpern & Pearl suggest the following model:
BS
BHSH
BTST
ST = 1
BT = 1
SH = ST
BH = BT ∧ ¬SH
BS = SH ∨BH
This seems to be a good model, and it works. Suzy’s path is strongly
active: given that Billy’s rock does not hit, had Suzy not thrown, the bottle
would not have shattered.
But Billy’s path (BT −−I BH −−I BS) is not active. It is not active
because it is not strongly active and the redundancy range is degenerate.
It is not strongly active because Suzy’s rock actually hits, so BH = 0 no
matter what Billy does. The redundancy range is degenerate because only
(SH = 0) leaves BH unchanged, and BH is on our path.
Therefore BT −−I BH −−I BS was inactive. There being no other path
from BT , Billy’s throw did not cause the bottle to smash.
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H2 can handle most cases in the philosophy literature. However, Halpern
and Pearl (forthcoming) present one which H2 cannot handle.3
1.4 Problem and diagnosis
The Voting Machine example (Halpern and Pearl, forthcoming, Example A.3)
shows that H2 is too strict about leaving φ unchanged. Suppose we model a
simple voting scenario. Two people (V1 and V2) vote, and the measure passes
(P ) if at least one votes in favor. Both vote in favor, and the measure passes.
This scenario is similar to Matches, and both votes cause the measure to
pass. Suppose we now introduce a voting machine (M) that tabulates the
votes first. Then our model is:
M
P
V1 V2
V1 = 1
V2 = 1
M = V1 + V2
P = M ≥ 1
However, H2 now says that neither V1 = 1 nor V2 = 1 causes P = 1.
Like Matches, neither path is strongly active. Unlike Matches, they are not
active at all, because the redundancy range is degenerate. The problem is
V1 and V2 can affect P only via M , which is on the path. H2 explicitly
prevents the background variable from changing the value of variables along
the path. This is too strong. As Halpern & Pearl note, “we cannot insist on
the variables in [the path] remaining constant; instead, we require merely that
changes in [the background] not affect [E].” We now present their account.
We shall call it H3.
1.5 H3: Halpern & Pearl
Where Hitchcock forbids any alteration to the path, Halpern & Pearl allow
any alteration which does not affect E, but then add a “resetting” clause
that captures the crucial path asymmetry in cases of late cutting.
This is Halpern & Pearl’s account:4
3Our thanks to Chris Hitchcock for directing our attention to this case.
4We omit the exogenous error terms, which serve mostly to complicate the expressions
and assuage deterministic leanings. Second, we use helpful variable names. Finally, we
presume C is a single variable, so do not need their minimality condition AC3.
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Definition 8 (H3) C = c is a token cause of E = e iff:
AC1 Actually, c and e.
AC2 There is a partition of variables into φ (path) and β (background), with
C ∈ φ, and some values c′, b′ such that:
(A) If we were to set c′ and b′, we would get e′ 6= e.
(B) If we were to set c and b′, we would still get e, even if we reset
any of the other variables in φ to their actual values.
Recall that “set b” is shorthand for “set B = b”.
AC2(A) amounts to saying that there is a background state (b′) where c
can make a difference to e. Condition AC2(B) ensures that the background
b′ alone is insufficient to change e to e′: it means that b′ is in the redundancy
range for e. The “even if” bit about resetting variables in φ to their actual
values is only necessary in cases of late cutting.
Note: The background β often includes variables downstream from C.
That means our causal background to E — chosen to block alternate paths
of influence from C to E — will likely include the temporal foreground of C.
In the augmented bottle-smashing model, Suzy’s throw ST = 1 is a token
cause of BS = 1 in the same way it was for Hitchcock’s active paths: we use
a redundancy range to reveal the dependency. Choosing {BT,BH} as our
background, and setting BH = 0, we see that ST makes a difference.
Billy’s throw would similarly make a difference, save for the “resetting”
clause. Let the background be {ST, SH} (shown by the rounded box, below).
Setting SH = 0, Billy’s throw makes a difference.
BS
BHSH
BTST
*
However, the asterisk denotes we reset BH to its original value. Then BS =
0, in violation of AC2(B). Therefore this path is not an active path, and BT
is not an actual cause.
In the hope that it will help readers, we present this solution as two
opposing players taking turns in a short game. The “advocate” tries to
show that some C = c is a cause of E = e.5 To this end, he nominates
an active path, a value c′ 6= c, and context b′ such that given b′, c yields
5After all, every advocate must have a cause.
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e and c′ yields e′. Next the “naysayer” tries to find a way of resetting the
intermediate variables along that path to make it inactive (meaning that c
no longer yields e).
In the augmented bottle-smashing model, the dialogue would go some-
thing like this:
ADV: (BT = 1) [c] is a cause of (BS = 1) [e]. The path is φ = BT −−I BH −−I BS.
Background: β = {ST, SH}, and b′ sets SH = 0. Then the cause
makes a difference: c gives e, but c′ [BT = 0] gives e′ [BS = 0].
NAY: I agree that (SH = 0) is in the redundancy range for φ. But since
BH is on the original path, I reset it to its original value, BH = 0.
Now your cause makes no difference.
ADV: I concede.
In the voting machine case, it would go something like this:
V1 V2
M
P
*
ADV: (V1 = 1) [c] is a cause of (P = 1) [e]. The path is obviously
φ = V1 −−IM −−I P . Background: β = V2, and b′ sets V2 = 0. The
cause makes a difference: c gives e, and c′ [V1 = 0] gives e′ [P = 0].
NAY: Your b′ has made M = 1. I reset it to its original value, M = 2.
ADV: No worries. M = 2 still gives P = 1, the original e.
NAY: Fair dinkum. I have no other intermediate variables to try. You win.
When detailing Hitchcock’s account, we took the expedient of fixing the
entire background. That would still work here; H3 only requires that fixing
some subset of β allows c to make a difference. In the deterministic case, if
fixing some subset works, then there will also be a way to fix all of β. In the
probabilistic case, that won’t be true.
Of course, this is still limited to deterministic causation. However, the
probabilistic extension is straightforward.
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2 HP: A probabilistic extension
The counterfactuals in H1 through H3 are of the form, “if not (C = c),
then not (E = e).” That will not work for probabilistic causation. In the
Matches example, if each match acts independently with probability p of
burning down the forest, then both matches have a greater probability of
burning down the forest, but it still might not burn down. Both paths are
active because they change the probability that the forest will burn down.
HP replaces that absolute counterfactual with a change in probabilities:
“if not (C = c), then Pr(E = e) would have been different.”. We keep the
same desideratum APTC: c was a token cause (now meaning token causally
relevant) only if there was an active path from c to e. We will, of course,
redefine active paths to mean probabilistic differences.
We could call this “Probabilistic Token Causal Relevance” to distinguish
it from the absolute version. But that would suggest there was a place for
the non-probabilistic account.
Following Hitchcock, our first version uses strongly active paths, so it still
has trouble with some cases of symmetric overdetermination (like the original
Matches example) and late cutting (like Bottle).
Parallelling Hiddleston, we will call these HP1, HP2, and HP3.
2.1 HP1: Strongly active paths
We keep the earlier definition of strongly active path. However, “makes a
difference” now simply means that there is a change in probabilities rather
than outcomes, so it is worth rewriting. Because we shall later introduce
another kind of difference making, we shall call this ∆1 rather than just ∆.
Define
∆1 = Pr(e|Ic)− Pr(e|Ic′)
Intuitively, a path is strongly active when ∆1 6= 0. However, with finite
data and limited computing power, we cannot be so stringent. Let 0 ≤ ² <
1 denote some tolerance threshold below which we consider the change in
probability to be insignificant. More precisely, we set ² to a value which
balances the disutility of false positives with those of false negatives. Then:
Definition 9 (Strongly active) A path φ = 〈C, Y1, . . . , Yn, E〉 is strongly
active in causal model M iff |∆1| > ² in the β-actual model.
Recall that replacing the background β is an intervention, so the equa-
tion for ∆1 implicitly conditions on Iβ = Ib1,...,bm . As before, this definition
requires an explicit contrast class c′.6
6Because we have intervened to set β, we can let c′ default to the distribution on C
after fixing β.
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We have chosen to make ∆1 relative to the probability of the actual state
e, because we think this is the most straightforward extension of the deter-
ministic accounts. However, if E has more than two states, it is possible that
c versus c′ changes the distribution over E without affecting a particular state
e. For example, suppose E lists several possible causes of death. For a given
background, it may well be that pipe smoking gives the same probability of
fatal heart attack as cigarette smoking, but that pipe smoking makes you
less likely to die of lung cancer (and more likely you will die of esophogeal
cancer or natural causes).
If we want such changes to count, we could just measure the distance
between the entire distribution Pr(E|Ic) − Pr(E|Ic′), using say Kullback-
Leibler “distance” or Bhattacharyaa distance. We leave that aside for this
paper.
Roughly then, HP1 says:
Definition 10 (HP1) c was token causally relevant to e iff there was a
strongly active path, and actually C = c and E = e.
Speakers often want to know more than just that smoking is causally
relevant. They want to know the direction (or valence) of the influence.
However, C may promote E along some paths, and hinder E along other
paths. Therefore C may both promote and prevent E. (Of course, in any
particular context the net effect will be either positive, negative, or neutral.)
Definition 11 (Token Promotion) c token promotes e iff for some path
φ:
1. c is token causally relevant to e along φ, with
2. ∆1 > 0: (Relative to c
′, c increases the chance of e.)
Definition 12 (Token Inhibition) c token inhibits e iff for some path φ:
1. c is token causally relevant to e along φ, with
2. ∆1 < 0: (Relative to c
′, c decreases the chance of e.)
Consider a simple probabilistic version of Matches whereM1 alone results
in FB = 1 with probability s, and M2 alone with chance t. Then FB = 0
with chances (1 − s) and (1 − t). Assume the forest cannot burn down
spontaneously. Then if s = t = .9, and the matches act independently, our
model might be:
M2M1
FB
.9 .9
M1 = 1
M2 = 1
Pr(FB) = 1− (1− s)M1(1− t)M2
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where the exponents just switch the terms on and off, since M1 and M2
are binary. The equation for FB expresses the idea that M1 and M2 act
independently, so their chances of failure multiply. In the diagram, s = t = .9,
so Pr(FB = 1) = .9 when either match acts alone, and .99 when they both
act. Therefore, ∆1 > 0 for both M1 and M2. Both are strongly active (and
promoters).
If, however, we redefine FB = max(s, t), then in the model shown,
Pr(FB) = .9 so long as any match is lit. Therefore, neither is strongly
active. The original (deterministic) Matches is just a special case of this
condition — one with extreme probabilities.
2.2 HP2: Active paths
Once again, the guiding intuition is that c was a token cause of e if there was
a context where wiggling C made a difference. But now, we are allowed to
consider more than just the actual context. We are allowed to consider all
contexts in the redundancy range.
As before, let ∆1 be the difference in effect between c and c
′, but relative
to the context b. To determine whether a context is in the redundancy
range, we must establish that changing context alone leaves unchanged the
probabilities of all actual states along our path, including e. Let x range
over these actual states of variables along our path. Let ∆2 be the difference
between doing c in the actual case (b) and in the alternative case (b′). That
is:
∆1 = Pr(e|Ic,b)− Pr(e|Ic′,b)
∆2(x) = Pr(x|Ic,b)− Pr(x|Ic,b′)
We make the plausible assumption that the threshold for ∆2 is the same
² as for ∆1. Then we can rewrite the definitions for Redundancy Range and
Active Paths:
Definition 13 (Redundancy range) Given an instantiated causal model
M and a path φ = 〈C, Y1, . . . , Yn, E〉, and the background β = Π\φ = {B1, . . . , Bm},
the vector of values b′ = 〈b1, . . . , bm〉 lies in β’s redundancy range for φ iff
for all variables X ∈ φ with actual state x, |∆2(x)| ≤ ².
Definition 14 (β-redundant model) as before
Definition 15 (Active) A path φ = 〈C, Y1, . . . , Yn, E〉 is active in causal
model M iff |∆1| > ² in some β-redundant model.
So HP2 says that if we can find such an active path, c was token causally
relevant:
Definition 16 (HP2) c was token causally relevant to e iff there was an
active path and C = c and E = e.
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This happens iff for some φ and some b′, |∆1| > ² and ∀x ∈ φ : |∆2(x)| ≤ ².
Definition 17 (Token Promotion) as before
Definition 18 (Token Inhibition) as before
2.3 HP3: Resetting Ranges
To extend H3, we need to generalize the idea of intervention. We shall
need to be able to “clamp” not only the values of a variable, but more
generally, probability distribution over the values. For example, we might
clamp SH = 〈0.7, 0.3〉, rendering SH insensitive to other influences. The
details are described in Korb et al. (2004). (We ignore their provision for
imperfect or leaky clamps which still allow the original parents to influence
the clamped variable.) We denote this kind of intervention as I~c, meaning
that we provide a new distribution for C.
Usually we will clamp the distribution of an unset variable at its current
values. Such an intervention has no effect downstream, but cuts all back-
paths, giving us exactly what we need: the ability to distinguish causes and
effects by the asymmetries of intervention.
Recall that the main difference between H3 and H2 was that H3 cares
only about changes to E, not all of φ. So b′ lies in β’s redundancy range for
φ iff |∆2(e)| ≤ ². We can just write ∆2 to mean ∆2(e), since we no longer
need to range over all X ∈ φ.
Then we can add the notion of resetting variables along φ, by clamping
them to their actual probability distributions. Any variable along φ can
be clamped or not, so if there are n such variables, there are 2n possible
combinations. Let R be the set of all 2n combinations.7 Then, ∀r ∈ R we
intervene I~r and verify |∆2| ≤ ² remains true. (We add our clamp I~r to the
interventions already done for ∆2.) Therefore:
Definition 19 (HP3-active) A path φ is active iff for some b′ in the re-
dundancy range for φ:
1. |∆1| > ². (Wiggling C makes a difference.)
2. ∀r ∈ R, I~r leaves |∆2| ≤ ².
Then c was a token cause (relative to c′) iff there was such an active path
from C to E, and actually C = c and E = e.
7In parallel with “redundancy ranges”, we can call R the “resetting ranges”.
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2.4 An anti-symmetry proof
We show that when ∆1 and ∆2 have the same ², then a cause is just the op-
posite of a redundant background condition. The intuition is clear: a cause is
something which makes enough of a difference, and a redundant background
condition is something which does not. The proof is straightforward, pro-
vided we can extend the notion of “cause” to multi-variable sets, even if only
analogously.
We first write both ∆1 and ∆2 as functions of a common abstract ∆. All
practical consequences flow from that lemma, regardless whether you wish to
restrict the word “cause” to single variables. We assume all variables are sep-
arately intervenable, which entails they are not logically or mathematically
related. We do the proof for HP3.
Lemma ∆1(x, y, z) = ∆2(y, x, z)
Proof. In HP3, ∆2 does not range over all X ∈ φ, so the quantities are
simply:
∆1 = Pr(e|Ic,b)− Pr(e|Ic′,b)
∆2 = Pr(e|Ic,b)− Pr(e|Ic,b′)
Notice we can write both ∆1 and ∆2 as variants of a single function ∆:
∆(x, y, z) = Pr(e|Ix,y)− Pr(e|Iz,y)
where notionally, x is the cause, y is the actual background, and z is the
contrast class. Then:
∆1 = ∆(c,b, c
′)
∆2 = ∆(b, c,b
′)
or more generally,
∆1(x, y, z) = ∆(x, y, z)
∆2(x, y, z) = ∆(y, x, z)
We see immediately that: ∆1(x, y, z) = ∆2(y, x, z).
Theorem 1 (Anti-symmetry) c (vs c′) token causes e in context b′ iff b′
(vs the actual background b) does not cause e in context c.
Proof. Suppose that actually c, e,b.
Suppose c (vs c′) token causes e. Then there must be a redundant back-
ground b′, meaning that |∆2| ≤ ². By substitution from the Lemma,
|∆(b, c,b′)| ≤ ² (1)
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Now suppose for contradiction that same redundant context b′ was itself a
“cause” of e, in context c. (The context is trivially redundant, since actually
c.) Then |∆1| > ². By the ∆ Lemma, that means:
|∆(b, c,b′)| > ² (2)
which directly contradicts Equation 1.
The proof in the other direction merely reverses the inequalities. QED
Corollary: The claim also holds for HP1. This follows immediately be-
cause HP1 just requires that the redundant background b′ is the actual
background b. Therefore both 1) and 2 are 0 trivially, giving us the contra-
diction.
Corollary: The claim also holds for HP2. HP2 requires that |∆2(x)| ≤ ²
for all actual values x of variables along the active path. Therefore it holds
for |∆2(e)|, which is what we used in Equation 1.
3 Examples
We show that HP3 handles deterministic cases and also some novel proba-
bilistic variants. In many cases the probabilistic variants are easier to handle,
because paths are more likely to be strongly active.
Deterministic Disjunctive Matches: As before, FB = M1 ∨M2. But
this is equivalent to saying Pr(FB = 1) = M1 ∨ M2. Did M1 = 1 cause
FB = 1? Yes. M2 = 0 is in the redundancy range, thus we may set it so.
And then M1 makes a difference to Pr(FB). More formally:
— Actually, M1 = 1 and FB = 1.
— Let ² = 0.
— Let b′ be M2 = 0. Then ∆2 = 0 ≤ ². So b′ is in the redundancy range.
— |∆1| = 1 > ². (There are no path variables to clamp.) So M1 makes a
difference.
By symmetry, the same holds for M2.
Probabilistic Matches: As before, presume both matches cause FB in-
dependently, with failure probabilities σ and τ .
M1 = 1
M2 = 1
Pr(FB) = 1− σM1τM2
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For example, let σ = .3 and τ = .2, so the probability of the forest burning
down is:
M1 M2 Pr(FB = 1)
0 0 0
0 1 .8
1 0 .7
1 1 .94
Then, letting C = M1 and β = {M2}, actually c = b = 1, and Pr(FB = 1) =
.94. Choosing ² = .1:
1. Actually, c and e.
2. In the actual background (M2 = 1):
— The background change is redundant. (Trivially, since we have
chosen the actual value for M2!)
— There are no variables along φ, so no clamping is needed.
— |∆1| = |Pr(e|IM1=1,M2=1)− Pr(e|IM1=0,M2=1)| = |.94− .8| = .14 >
².
The path is strongly active, and M1 = 1 is an actual promoter (positively
causally relevant). What about M2? Proceeding similarly, we find that
|∆1| = |.94 − .7| = .24, so M2 = 1 is also an actual promoter. However,
note that the answer is sensitive to ². Depending on how strong we require a
causal factor to be, we can exclude one or both of M1 and M2. For example,
if we choose ² = 0.2, then M2 = 1 is a promoter, but M1 = 1 is not relevant.
Also note that by Theorem 1, Mx = 1 is a cause iff it is not a suitable
background for making My a cause.
Max matches: This parallels Probabilistic Matches, but we let Pr(FB =
1) = max(sM1, tM2). As before, Mx is a binary indicator variable for the
proposition “match x is lit”, s is the probability of FB given M1&¬M2, and
similarly for t. Let s = 0.7 and t = 0.8.
First, consider ² < 0.1. Then M2 = 1 is a promoter of FB = 1, but
M1 = 1 is not. We have:
1. Actually, M1 = 1,M2 = 1, FB = 1, and Pr(FB = 1) = 0.8.
2. The path from M2 is strongly active: wiggling M2 makes a difference,
because Pr(FB = 1) changes from 0.8 to 0.7. M2 = 1 is a promoter.
3. Wiggling M1 makes no difference: M2 = 1 is carrying the load.
4. And M2 = 0 is outside the redundancy range for M1, precisely because
it makes a difference all by itself. So M1 is not causally relevant.
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Now suppose 0.1 < ² < 0.7. Once again, M2 = 1 is a promoter. But now,
so is M1 = 1.
1. Wiggling M1 makes no noticeable difference. However, M2 = 0 is now
in the redundancy range for M1.
2. Setting M2 = 0, wiggling M1 now makes ∆1 = 0.8. M1 = 1 is a
promoter.
3. Once again, wiggling M2 makes no difference. However, M1 = 0 is now
in the redundancy range forM2, because it only changes the probability
by 0.1
4. Setting M1 = 0, we now have that wiggling M2 makes a difference:
∆1 = 0.7. M2 = 1 is a promoter.
A note on ²: As the previous example shows, ² is not just a concession
to limited precision; it could also be a personal preference parameter based
upon the disutility of error. Indeed, determinists can always set ² ≈ 1. They
will be blessed with few causes.
From here on, we shall assume ² = 0 unless stated otherwise.
Deterministic Bottle: As we saw above, in the deterministic models, we
get the same answers as before: we just convert deterministic functions like
BT = SH ∨ BH to probabilistic functions like Pr(BT = 1) = SH ∨ BH.
Let’s move on to probabilistic variants.
Probabilistic Bottle 1: Being more realistic, we allow that Suzy some-
times misses, and so does Billy. The model is ST −−I BS J−−BT . Here,
both ST and BT are potentially causes, exactly as in Probabilistic Matches.
If both Suzy and Billy have the same chance of hitting, then both count
equally as promoters.
Yet we want to say, “But only Suzy’s rock actually hit!” As Halpern
& Pearl argued, we have the wrong model: we have omitted the obviously
important variable Hit. Given the story, the probability Billy hits given
that Suzy throws is less than the probability that Suzy hits, given that Billy
throws.
First, we know that Suzy throws faster, and will hit first, if at all. Second,
we know that if her throw will hit, Billy’s cannot. (This modelling assumption
assumes she throws enough faster that the bottle will be shattered by the
time Billy’s rock arrives.) Third, we suspect that at some point prior to
the bottle shattering, the outcome is sealed. That is, at some point, there
is no more indeterminism in this system. Halpern & Pearl take this to be
when one rock hits the bottle, presumably a very short time indeed before
the bottle shatters.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1: Probabilistic version of Bottle Smash: results of intervening to fix
the probability distributions. (a) the original state; (b) clamping SH has no
effect on BS; (c) but clamping BH does
Probabilistic Bottle 2: So we use Halpern & Pearl’s model (Figure 1,
but include the chance of failure. We add noise to the two initial arcs, for
example: ST
.7−−I SH and BT .8−−I BH. We leave the other arcs as they
were, so: SH −−I BS J−−BH and also SH −−I BH. Given knowledge only
of ST and BT , the probability of the bottle smashing is:
ST BT Pr(BS = 1)
0 0 0
0 1 .8
1 0 .7
1 1 .94
This is the same as for Matches. The redundancy ranges for both Suzy and
Billy are degenerate. At first it seems that both ST = 1 and BT = 1 are
promoters. However, we must allow for clamping the variables along the
active path.
The network is shown in three states in Figure 1. When we clamp SH =
{0.7, 0.3}, the distribution Pr(BS) is unchanged. ST = 1 is an actual cause.
However, when we clamp BH = {.77, .23}, Pr(BS) changes, so ∆2 > ²,
meaning that BT is not actually a cause.
This works because these interventions block the usual backwards flow of
probability, privileging upstream variables. (As an aside, we must be willing
to consider the possibility that by intervention we can make both SH = 1
and BH = 1. Such constraints help to choose the proper models. We cannot,
for example, replace BS with two binary variables Smashed and Intact (see
Korb et al., 2005)).
Probabilistic Boulder: In Hitchcock’s example Boulder, suppose F
.9−−I
D, with the rest as before, including that the hiker won’t duck spontaneously.
Then everything proceeds as before: once the boulder has fallen (or not),
everything is determined, so F is not actually causally relevant to S.
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Let’s add some more noise. Suppose that the CPT at S is:
F D Pr(S = 1)
0 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 .01
1 1 .8
Now, F = 1 is actually causally relevant. In fact, it inhibits survival, as
we might expect. Given that the hiker ducked, F = 1 reduces the chances of
survival relative to F = 0, as we can see in Figure 2. But that is just what
we would expect.
Figure 2: Probabilistic version of Boulder: now F = 1 is actually causally
relevant. It decreases the chances of survival relative to F = 0 (and therefore
relative to baseline).
Trainee Assassin: Hiddleston (2005) uses the example of the assassin and
trainee to suggest that active path accounts cannot handle probabilistic cases.
The original story is that a trainee assassin T shoots at a victim V . The
supervisor also takes aim, prepared to shoot if the trainee loses nerve. Being
deterministic, Victim’s survival requires neither shot to be fired.
T S
V
T = 1
S = ¬T
V = ¬T ∧ ¬S
In the actual case, the trainee shoots, the supervisor does not, and the victim
dies. Although such examples are problems for simple dependency accounts,
it is easy for any account which considers one path at a time. The path
T −−I V is strongly active, so all accounts presented here get it right.
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Stochastic Assassin: Hiddleston says that the analysis from either H1
or H2 (and by implication H3) does not survive a probabilistic extension.
Add an extra variable for the supervisor taking aim, and let the model be
probabilistic, with no extreme probabilities. The supervisor is unlikely to fire
without aiming, and always more likely to fire if he aims. Our model might
look like this:
T
V
S A
+−
+ +
Consider whether A = 1 is an actual cause. The only background vari-
able is T , and only the actual value T = 1 is redundant. In this context,
the supervisor aiming (A = 1) changes the probability the victim will die,
compared with not aiming (A = 0).8 Clamping S at the prior distribution
induced by {A, T} has no effect on V .
Therefore A = 1 is on an active path and is a cause. Hiddleston thinks
this is wrong, because in actual fact the supervisor did not shoot.
But note that we have asked if A = 1 is a cause in the null context. We
pretend we do not know that S = 0. And here, on the standard “determina-
tion of probabilities” interpretation, changing the probability of an effect is
causing that effect (either promoting or inhibiting). In fact, that’s all there
is to probabilistic causation (Humphreys, 1989). Hence, we could argue that
A is a cause.
Our “common sense” appears to be taking advantage of the causal fore-
ground, namely, that S = 0. Fixing (S = 0) cuts the active path and renders
A noncausal. In that context we get the right answer: A = 1 was not a cause
because in fact, S = 0.
However, our account succumbs to Hiddleston’s deterministic Antidote
example.
Antidote: Fred injects himself with harmless antidote (A = 1) on the false
belief that he has been (or is about to be) poisoned (P ).9 The model is
simple: P −−I S J−− A, and S = ¬P ∨ A. Fred survives when S = 1.
In fact there is no poison (P = 0), so the antidote was irrelevant. However,
because A = 1, the redundancy range includes P = 1. Had there been poison,
antidote would have made a difference, hence the path A−−I S was active. As
Hiddleston says, “That is the wrong answer. H2 [and H3] counts (A = 1) an
8It happens to raise it. But what makes the path active is the fact that the probability
changed at all, not that it went up. Hiddleston says we should “treat counterfactual
dependence as probability raising” but that confuses relevance and role. His main criticism
is independent of that point.
9Or if you prefer, the king’s bodyguard puts antidote in the king’s coffee, but in fact
there was no poison there to neutralize.
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‘actual cause’ merely because it would have been a cause if the circumstances
had been different. . . .”
Hiddleston notes that H1 correctly says (A = 1) is not a cause. But it
also says (P = 0) is not a cause, leaving (S = 1) uncaused! That’s the same
problem we had with Matches. As with matches, if we make the example
probabilistic, the difficulties vanish, and any of HP1, HP2, and HP3 can
solve it, even deterministically.
But we want an account that can handle this case as it stands. Hiddleston
presents a solution in terms of Cheng-style causation. We offer our own
solution using wounded arcs elsewhere (Korb et al., 2005). The account
differs from Hiddleston’s, but we agree that the accounts presented here are
limited by failing to attend to causal processes.
4 Conclusion
The active path approach treats token causation as type causation in a re-
stricted context. The trick is to find the proper context. We have extended
the active path analyses of deterministic token causation (Halpern and Pearl,
2001, forthcoming; Hitchcock, 2001) to probabilistic cases, defending that
project against impossibility claims (Hiddleston, 2005). Our solution makes
use of a more general notion of intervention, allowing one to set an arbitrary
probability distribution on a variable (Korb et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, we acknowledge some of Hiddleston’s counterexamples, and
agree with him that a full account must make reference to causal processes.
We begin to develop such an account in Korb et al. (2005).
Appendix: Calculating Procedures
Since Bayesian networks are computational objects, it is helpful to write
down algorithms for calculating the relevant quantities. In fact, we would
argue that it is necessary to prevent confusion over what is being held fixed,
or tacitly assumed. Furthermore, if we are this explicit, it is straightforward
to translate the theory into a computer program, and to compare various
theories on a library of known cases. Finally, problems in the account can
be treated as bugs in the algorithm, and modifications naturally seen as
extensions to the existing account. Furthermore, future accounts can be
easily compared.
We now present algorithms to determine whether paths are active, and
whether C was token causally relevant to E in accordance with HP1 or
HP3. Most algorithms presume the following are common knowledge:
C (the Cause node)
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function HP1:
Presumes: as per strongly active.
Find the most active path:
let ∆ = 0, φmax = ∅
foreach φ in allpaths(C,E):
let d = strongly active(φ, c′)
if |d| > |∆|:
let ∆ = d, φmax = φ
return (∆, φ)
function HP3:
Presumes: as per HP3 active.
Find the most active path:
let ∆ = 0, φmax = ∅
foreach φ in allpaths(C,E):
let d = HP3 active(φ)
if |d| > |∆|:
let ∆ = d, φmax = φ
return (∆, φ)
Figure 3: HP1 and HP3 return the most active of the active paths. If there
are none, they return the tuple (0, ∅).
E (the Effect node)
net (The network)
values (The actual states of the variables up to E, inclusive)
Π (All ancestors of E)
c′ (Optional contrast)
² (Threshold, defaults to 0)
Furthermore, they presume the network is uninstantiated and that we have
already performed basic error-checking, such as:
Error-checking: Raise an error in any of these cases:
(1) ² < 0, or ² ≥ 1.
(2) c′ is present but invalid (not a state in C).
In object-oriented programming languages, this common knowledge could
be implemented as a class. The main benefit is to reduce the number of
variables we have to pass to our functions, and avoid duplication of error-
checking. Some values (such as Π) can be calculated from the others.
The main functions are HP1 and HP3 (Figure 3) which test all paths
between C and E to see if they are active. If any path is appropriately active,
then C was token causally-relevant for E. Our implementations return the
most active path (largest |∆1|), and its ∆1. They both use allpaths (Figure
4) which finds all paths from C to E by recursively searching down from
C. Of course, they have different criteria for active, calling respectively,
strongly active (Figure 4) and hp3 active (Figure 5).
The functions strongly active (Figure 4) and hp3 active (Figure 5) are just
front-ends to delta (Figure 5), which does all the work, using the symmetry
discussed in Section 2.4.
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function allpaths:
Variables:
S (source node)
D (destination node)
Φ = ∅ (List of all paths)
let kids = children of S
if D ∈ kids:
add (S,D) to Φ
remove D from kids
foreach kid ∈ kids:
paths = allpaths(kid,D)
foreach φ ∈ paths:
add (S + φ) to Φ
return Φ
function strongly active:
Uses delta() to see whether |∆1| > ²
Presumes: as per delta()
Variables:
φ The path 〈C, Y1, . . . , Yn, E〉
c′ Contrast class
let β = Π\φ Background (B1, . . . , Bm)
return delta(C, β, c′)
Figure 4: allpaths returns all (directed) paths from source (S) to destination
(D), and strongly active returns ∆1 if the path is strongly active (|∆1| > ²),
otherwise 0.
HP3 (Figure 3) calls hp3 active on all paths, and once again returns the
most active. However, hp3 active is computationally intensive, so we might
prefer that HP3 return as soon as it finds one active path.
The function hp3 active in turn calls the utility functions redundancy ranges
and resetting ranges (Figures 6 & 7). We have written these in the most
straightforward way, with exhaustive search. In the toy problems common
in the philosophy literature, this is fine, but for realistic networks, we should
look for more efficient procedures that take advantage of blocking relations
in the network.
Similarly, these algorithms assume it is easy and fast to intervene upon
variables, or unset them. In practice, these steps may take time, and a
programming implementation would likely modify the algorithms to reduce
the number of such calls. For example, it might be faster to start with the
network fully instantiated, and unset paths as required.
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function HP3 active:
Presumes: as per strongly active
save φ.
Variables:
φ 〈C, Y1, . . . , Yn, E〉
c′ Contrast class
let β = Π\φ The Background
foreach b′ in redundancy ranges(β, φ):
Ib′ Sets all vars in this b′.
Check |∆| > ²
if not strongly active (φ, c′):
go to next b′
Check ∀r ∈ R : I~r leaves |∆2| ≤ ²
foreach r in resetting ranges(φ):
I~r Clamp at actual distributions.
if not redundant(b′, φ):
go to next b′
Success! Found a b’ that works!
return strongly active(φ, c′)
If we get here, nothing passed.
return 0
function delta:
∆(X,Y, x′) = Pr(e|Ix,y)− Pr(e|Ix′,y)
Presumes net is completely uninstantiated
Variables:
X The notional cause(s). (C or β)
Y The notional background. (β or C)
x′ Contrast state(s) for X.
Error if length(X) 6=length(x′)
Probability for actual state x, y:
x = values(X), y = values(Y )
Ix,y
update net
let p1 = belief of state e ∈ E
Probability for contrast class x′, y:
if x′ is defined: Ix′
else: unset X
update net
let p2 = belief of state e ∈ E
unset(X,Y ) Return net to clean state.
let ∆ = p1 − p2
if |∆| > ²: return ∆
else: return 0
Figure 5: HP3 active returns ∆1 if φ was active, and 0 otherwise. delta
does the real work. Depending on how it is called, it calculates |∆1| > ² or
|∆2| ≤ ².
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function redundancy ranges:
Presumes net is completely uninstantiated
Variables:
φ (The path)
Get Pr(e|Ic,b).
let β = Π\φ
let b = values(β)
Ic,b
update net
p1 = Pr(e)
let RR = ∅
Try each possible instantiation of β.
let B = all instantiations(β)
foreach full branch b′ ∈ B:
if redundant(b′, φ):
add b′ to RR
unset c & b′ Clean network
return RR
function all instantiations:
Variables:
β List of vars. The ‘background’.
let B = pop(β) Removes β1
if length(β) = 0: Base case
return (states of B) (a list)
Build A, a tree of states
let A = ∅
foreach state s ∈ B:
add (s + all instantiations(β)) to A
return A
Figure 6: redundancy ranges returns a list of all redundant b′. It uses
all instantiations to get B, a tree showing all possible b′.
function redundant:
Computes whether |∆2| ≤ ²
Presumes: as per delta
Variables:
b′ Contrast class for β.
φ The path: 〈C, Y1, . . . , Yn, E〉
Note: ensure length(b′) = length(β).
Generally some b′i = bi.
let β = Π\φ The background
return delta(β,C, b′)
function resetting ranges:
Variables:
φ Path variables
if φ is empty:
return ∅ Empty list
let p = pop(φ) Removes φ1
let s = current distribution of p
let rr = resetting ranges(φ)
Make 2 branches: p set and p unset
return [ [(p, s), rr], [(p,−), rr] ]
Figure 7: redundant determines whether a set of background values b′ is
redundant for φ, and resetting ranges finds all possible ways to clamp some
variables along the active path at their actual distributions.
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